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TO JUSTICE? WAS THAT WHY IT WAS 
ADOPTED? 
JOHN LEUBSDORF† 
An intriguing recent article by Peter Karsten and Oliver Bateman,1 
exploring the history of the American Rule under which each party to civil 
litigation bears the cost of its own lawyer, defends that Rule as promoting 
access to justice for deserving plaintiffs, as compared to the English Rule 
under which a prevailing party ordinarily recovers its own attorney fees from 
its losing opponent. Karsten and Bateman criticize as “inaccurate and 
misleading”2 the assertion in my history of the Rule that this justification for 
it was not advanced before the twentieth century.3  
This reply takes issue with both of those contentions. First, I will show 
that, even though the American Rule encourages some claims, it discourages 
others, and cannot on the whole be defended as opening the courthouse doors 
to deserving claimants. Second, I will show that the cases on which 
Professors Karsten and Bateman rely in asserting that the American Rule 
was introduced to promote access to justice do not support that reading but 
concern quite different issues. Rather, it was not until the twentieth century 
that anyone sought to defend the American Rule on any such theory—which 
is not surprising, given the complex and ambivalent effects of that rule on 
aspiring plaintiffs. 
First, some clarifications. I am not an advocate of the English Rule. I 
welcome Professors Karsten’s and Bateman’s criticisms of recent proposals 
to import that rule to the United States in the hope of dampening perceived 
unwarranted litigation4—though I see the English Rule initiatives as a 
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258  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:257 
relatively minor campaign in the broader conservative war against plaintiffs.5 
I agree with much else that Karsten and Bateman say, and in particular that 
contingent fees, whose history they have traced,6 do indeed promote access 
to justice by plaintiffs, and were legitimized for just that reason.  
My claim is that the effects of the American Rule (and the English Rule) 
are complex and sometimes unpredictable, varying with such factors as the 
costs of litigation to each party, the ability of plaintiffs to pay attorney fee 
awards, and the procedures and standards for assessing fees. In addition, 
other rules and practices help shape the impact of each rule, for example, the 
status of contingent fee arrangements and one-way attorney fee statutes, the 
availability of legal aid, and the economics of the plaintiffs’ bar. The 
American Rule was not introduced to aid plaintiffs. It arose in the nineteenth 
century from the efforts of lawyers to charge their clients more than fee 
recovery rules allowed, and during that century it was not appraised in terms 
of its impact on meritorious claims.7 
I.  THE AMERICAN RULE’S IMPACT 
 Both the opponents and many of the supporters of the American Rule 
often assume that it tends to encourage plaintiffs to sue because, even if they 
fail, they will not have to pay the defendant’s legal expenses. Professors 
Karsten and Bateman share this assumption, defending the American Rule 
and contingent fees because they “provide plaintiffs . . . more reliable access 
to judicial hearings with less expense for poorer plaintiffs and the elimination 
of the fear of punishing loser pays costs.”8 Their assertions to this effect 
constitute the “public policy rationales for the American Rule” that the title 
of their article announces. 
Yet for many years, scholars have been showing that this 
characterization is an oversimplification, both theoretically and in the real 
world.9 The rule is symmetrical, at least in form. Although it does protect 
losing plaintiffs from having to pay defendants’ litigation expenses, it also 
denies them recovery of their own expenses when they prevail. If it 
 
 5.  See generally STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017). 
 6.  Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 733–36; Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their 
Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingent Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 
(1998). 
 7.  Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 13–24. 
 8.  Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 761. 
 9.  AVERY WIENER KATZ, INDEMNITY OF LEGAL FEES, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
63 (Boudewijn Bouckert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1st ed. 2000). This survey cites many previous works 
on which I have drawn in writing the following paragraphs. 
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encourages some plaintiffs to sue rather than “lumping it,”10 it may also 
encourage some defendants to defend suits rather than paying up. Many 
questions must be answered before we can appraise the Rule’s effects with 
any hope of accuracy. 
A. Compared to What?  
Notwithstanding the supporters of the English Rule, the American 
Rule’s major competitor in recent decades has been the proliferation of one-
way fee statutes that grant attorney fee recovery routinely to prevailing 
plaintiffs but rarely to prevailing defendants.11 Passing more such statutes 
and extending their principle to some common law litigation12 is the most 
obvious way to make it possible for deserving plaintiffs to sue.13 Beyond 
that, one can imagine many hybrid rules and combinations of rules—indeed, 
that is the existing situation in the United States—with varying effects on 
what claims are brought. 
B.  Which Claims?  
Of course, not all claims are equally deserving of encouragement, and 
some can be considered noxious.14 But assuming that it is desirable to nurture 
a class of claims, the American Rule is not invariably more effective in doing 
that than the English Rule. 
The American Rule, unlike the English Rule, makes it difficult or 
impossible to assert claims when the cost of litigation exceeds the probable 
recovery. For example, the cost of bringing a typical medical malpractice 
suit is likely to be at least $50,000, so suits are not viable unless the damages 
 
 10.  William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organizations on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 63, 81 (1974). 
 11.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k). 
 12.  See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN 
THE U.S. (2010). For more on the origins of one-way fee statutes, see Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, 
at 749, and Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 25–27, 29–30. 
 13.  John Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439 (1986). But 
sometimes further steps are needed. See generally SEAN FARHANG, CONGRESSIONAL MOBILIZATION OF 
PRIVATE LITIGANTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 (2009) (describing why Congress 
concluded that recovery of damages as well as attorney fees was needed to yield sufficient litigation 
against employment discrimination). 
 14.  Consider, for example, Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suits brought to 
deter the exercise of free speech. See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 425.16 (2015) (detailing state legislative 
findings of excessive SLAPP suits and prescribing procedural checks to limit their frequency); GEORGE 
W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996); Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent Claiming, 115 MICH. L. REV. 639, 647–66 
(2017) (surveying fraudulent tort claims). 
260  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:257 
are well above that amount.15 The American Rule also provides less 
encouragement than the English Rule to assert claims almost certain to 
prevail, because the prospect of recovering damages minus litigation 
expenses is less enticing than that of recovering damages while having the 
defendant cover litigation expenses. Because plaintiffs and their lawyers 
tend to believe that they have very strong cases, the encouragement provided 
by the English Rule may be greater than more objective appraisals would 
warrant.16 
On the other hand, the American Rule is more favorable than the 
English Rule for claims unlikely to prevail, including innovative claims that 
society should encourage, because the American Rule does not penalize 
failure with payment of the defendant’s expenses. For example, the first 
successful asbestos suits followed unsuccessful and costly failures that 
gradually unearthed the facts; had the plaintiffs and their lawyers been 
further burdened by responsibility for the defendants’ lawyer bills, success 
might have been beyond reach.17 Similarly, the American Rule is more 
favorable to plaintiffs than the English Rule in cases in which the defendant’s 
recoverable expenses are greater than those of the plaintiff, so that having to 
pay the defendant’s expenses would be disproportionately burdensome. 
Obviously, the extent to which courts limit what unsuccessful plaintiffs must 
pay to less than the defendant’s actual expenses will affect this situation. 
C. Which Plaintiffs?  
The English Rule encourages suits by plaintiffs who simply cannot pay 
any fee award entered against them. For those plaintiffs, the English Rule is 
a one-way rule under which they recover more if they prevail than under the 
American Rule, without having to pay anything if they lose. On the other 
hand, the English Rule is discouraging for plaintiffs who can afford to pay a 
fee award but would find it especially painful to do so, whether because their 
assets are modest or because they are risk averse.  
Interestingly enough, empirical evidence indicates that, even when the 
English Rule is in effect, it is rare for plaintiffs to pay for defendants’ 
attorney fees. This is the case in Alaska, which follows the English Rule; not 
surprisingly, it also turned out that there is little evidence that the minimal 
 
 15.  Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 151, 165–67 (2014). 
 16.  Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence 
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 377 (1990).  
 17.  See generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON 
TRIAL 6–180 (1985) (describing how between 1961 and 1981 lawyers uncovered increasing evidence 
supporting the liability of asbestos manufacturers). 
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possibility of having to pay defendants decreases filings.18 When Florida 
adopted the English Rule for medical malpractice cases, fee awards against 
plaintiffs were apparently also rare, the number of suits filed did not 
decrease, and the Florida Medical Society that had supported the innovation 
changed its position and supported its 1985 repeal.19 In both situations, the 
English Rule turned out to be at least as likely to encourage suits as the 
American Rule—though it might not work the same way in jurisdictions 
where defendants and judges are more willing to impose heavy fees on 
unsuccessful plaintiffs. In any event, since these empirical studies appeared, 
conservative interest in importing the English Rule seems to have 
diminished. 
D. What Context?  
Other legal and social institutions affect the impact of fee recovery 
rules. In the United States, the prevalence of contingent fees aids plaintiffs 
with promising claims for substantial damages to proceed, as Professors 
Karsten and Bateman note,20 and as those seeking to limit what they consider 
excessive litigation are well aware.21 That pro-plaintiff effect is now 
strengthened by the development of wealthy, entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, large plaintiffs’ law firms, and lawyer networks willing to subsidize 
innovative claims,22 and also by one-way fee recovery statutes,23 by the 
growth of litigation financing,24 and for some cases by public interest 
lawyering. These institutions rest on widely shared beliefs about  the right to 
a day in court, and the social role of the judicial system.25 It is because of 
these institutions and beliefs, not the American Rule, that plaintiffs with 
substantial claims secure access to court. And plaintiffs with small claims 
often have no access, notwithstanding the American Rule, because of the 
expense of litigation and the scarcity of public funding. The Legal Services 
 
 18.  ALAS. R. CIV. P. 82; SUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA KELLEY, ALASKA’S 
ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 100–05, 134–35, 138–39 (1995). 
 19.  Snyder & Hughes, supra note 16, at 355–56. For further analysis of the complex effects of the 
Florida legislation, see James. W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the 
English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1995). 
 20.  See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 21.  LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST 
AMERICA (2011). 
 22.  Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 210 (2001). 
 23.  See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 24.  See generally Symposium, A Brave New World: The Changing Face of Litigation and Law Firm 
Finance, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 193 (2014). 
 25.  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JOHN LEUBSDORF & DEBRA LYNN BASSETT, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 602–
04 (6th ed. 2011). 
262  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:257 
Corporation, for example, has struggled almost every year even to preserve 
its inadequate Congressional appropriation.26 
E. Which Rule?  
Terms like “English Rule” describe families of rules, whose details will 
affect their impact. Rulemakers must decide for example, on what basis the 
court will calculate its fee award, how it will treat varying degrees of success, 
and what exceptions will apply. Case law under fee recovery statutes 
indicates just how many questions arise,27the answers to which may affect 
the incentives created by the rule.28  
For example, the recent Texas “loser pays” rule that Karsten and 
Bateman discuss makes the loser pay when there is a motion to dismiss on 
the ground that the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint are insufficient in 
law or incredible in fact.29 Its focus is thus on pleading. Awards will correlate 
only loosely with the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, as required by the 
traditional English Rule. A poorly pleaded claim may be sanctioned even 
though the plaintiff actually has a valid claim on the merits, and a defendant 
may be sanctioned for moving to dismiss a well pleaded claim whose 
allegations are credible but wholly false. This rule may  impede access to 
court for some plaintiffs with valid claims, but its effects will be quite 
different from the traditional English Rule that sanctions the party that loses 
on the merits. 
F. What else?  
The comparative tendency of the American or English Rule to 
encourage plaintiffs to sue is only one factor bearing on the desirability of 
one or the other rule. How will one or the other rule affect the total cost of 
litigation? How will the choice of rule affect the likelihood of settlement? 
What about the amount of settlements, surely of much importance to 
plaintiffs and defendants alike? Much thought has been devoted to these and 
other questions.30 
Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument against the English Rule 
concerns not its impact on what claims are brought, but its encouragement 
 
 26.  EARL JOHNSON, JR., TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL 
AID IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3  (2014). 
 27.  ARTHUR D. WOLF & MARY FRANCES DERFNER, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (2016). 
 28.  E.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The 
Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007) 
(surveying how one Supreme Court ruling affected public interest litigation). 
 29.  TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a7; see also Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 751–54 (discussing the 
Texas rule). 
 30.  See sources cited supra notes 9, 16, 18. 
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of  expensive and lengthy court battles over just what fees should be 
awarded. As Professors Karsten and Bateman note, this has long been 
recognized.31 Under systems like Germany’s, which regulates fees by 
formula and sets them at relatively low levels, such battles are unlikely.32 
Not so in the United States, or for that matter in England.33 No one would 
want courts to award a successful party whatever fee the opponent’s lawyer 
chose to charge. Fee awards must therefore be limited to what is 
“reasonable,” and off we go. 
In fairness to Professors Karsten and Bateman, I note that the issues I 
have outlined do not fall within the scope of their article, which is devoted 
to legal history. Nineteenth century judges and lawyers did not analyze the 
American Rule in the way I have been doing, and neither do Professors 
Karsten and Bateman. That the American Rule promotes access to the courts 
is a proposition they assume rather than discuss—as is also true of some of 
the conservatives whose efforts to repeal that rule they describe. But that 
proposition pervades both their historical analysis and their conclusion that 
the American Rule, as supplemented by contingent fees, provides U.S. 
plaintiffs with “more reliable access to judicial hearings with less expense 
for poorer plaintiffs and the elimination of the fear of punishing loser pays 
costs” than what is available elsewhere.34 Those who wish to improve such 
access, and those who wish to understand the American Rule and its origins, 
cannot afford to rest on these unanalyzed assumptions about its effects. 
II.  THE AMERICAN RULE’S HISTORY 
Whether people in the nineteenth century justified the American Rule 
as promoting access to justice for plaintiffs, as Karsten and Bateman assert, 
is important as a matter of history. For example, it casts some light on the 
extent to which lawmakers sought to protect underdogs rather than 
entrepreneurs.35 More broadly, differing positions on this issue may reflect 
differing perspectives on the rationality of legal evolution.  
 
 31.  Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 747–48 (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier 
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)). For one of many reiterations of the point, see CRST Van 
Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1653 (2016). 
 32.  PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF H. STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 341–54 (2004). 
 33.  LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 27–38 
(2009); Adrian Zuckerman, New Rules for Costs Capping Orders: Feeding the Costs Litigation Frenzy?, 
28 CIV. J.Q. 289, 289–92 (2009). 
 34.  Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 761. 
 35.  Compare PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1997) (underdogs), with MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977) (entrepreneurs). Needless to say, these capsule summaries 
oversimplify.  
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As is often the case when lawyers debate the history of legal rules, 
current policy is also at stake here. If, as Karsten and Bateman contend, the 
American Rule has been grounded in fostering access to court from its 
inception, that would add to the rule’s present credibility and make it harder 
to jettison it. But if, as I claim to have shown, the Rule arose from a mixture 
of other concerns in a world whose contexts and concerns differeds from 
ours, we should be more ready to consider reforms such as the extension of 
one-way fee recovery.  
The conclusion of my own article was that the American Rule arose  
without being consciously steered by policy-makers. In colonial times, 
legislatures placed identical limits on what lawyers could charge their clients 
and what those clients could recover from an opposing party.36 During the 
early nineteenth century, as Karsten and Bateman also explain  lawyers 
succeeded in validating contracts with their clients for fees larger than what 
clients could recover from an opponent, leading to the effort to legitimate 
contingent fees for plaintiffs who could not afford market rates.37 This 
discrepancy between client fees and recoverable fees––which is the essence 
of the American Rule––was ratified in New York’s widely imitated Field 
Code of 1848, and in the federal costs statute of 1853.38 Courts proceeded to 
recognize the American Rule as a matter of established legislative policy 
without seeking further justifications in public policy, but also recognized 
exceptions where contracts or legislation provided for fee awards and under 
the “common fund” doctrine.39 Only in the twentieth century did 
commentators seek to explain the American Rule’s impact on litigation––
and then they disagreed about whether the Rule fosters or discourages 
claims, and whether in either case that is a good or a bad thing.40  
Professors Karsten and Bateman disagree in one significant way with 
this somewhat skeptical narrative: they claim to have “identified the 
nineteenth-century American state and federal judiciary’s public policy 
justifications for the contingency-fee contract and for the American Rule,”41 
those justifications being that attorney fees are not proximately caused by 
the opposing party, and that “jurists spoke as well of the need to ensure a 
 
 36.  See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 10–13 (summarizing the colonies’ various efforts to regulate 
attorneys fees by statute).  
 37.  See id. at 13–17; Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 730–36. 
 38.  Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 17–22. For the Field Code, see 1848 N.Y. Laws 258, 262–63. The 
federal statute is Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161. 
 39.  See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 23–27 (“Courts were content to refer generally to the legislative 
policy without specifying any reasons for it.”). For the common fund doctrine, see Trustees v. Greenough, 
105 U.S. 527, 529 (1881). 
 40.  Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 27–29. 
 41.  Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 761. 
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measure of access for those whose grievances entitled them to a judicial 
hearing without those persons fearing potentially heavy financial 
penalties.”42   
I continue to maintain that nineteenth-century judges did not assert a 
public policy rationale of access to justice (and, for that matter, a proximate 
cause rationale) to justify the American Rule, although I agree that they did 
invoke that rationale to justify contingent fees. To demonstrate this, I 
consider the thirteen nineteenth-century opinions and the piece of legislative 
history on which Professors Karsten and Bateman rely.43 I do not discuss a 
fourteenth case they quote at some length because it was decided in 1932;44 
I agree that some judges had asserted the access to justice rationale by then, 
and in fact I cited the same case among others to support that proposition.45 
Seven of the thirteen cases could scarcely evidence a desire to assist 
plaintiffs because they refuse to award plaintiffs attorney fees as part of their 
damages.46 Indeed, one of them warns that plaintiff fee recovery would make 
a claim “a standing dish,”47 another expresses sympathy for defendants 
forced to pay plaintiffs’ fees,48 and a third asserts that allowing successful 
plaintiffs to recover fees when successful defendants cannot “would give the 
former an unfair advantage in the contest.”49 Their concern is to protect 
defendants, not to assist plaintiffs. 
Some of these seven cases mention policy concerns other than 
plaintiffs’ access to court, but the crucial fact here is that these concern the 
law of damages, not the American Rule. As explained in my article: 
[C]uriously enough, courts were quite active in stating or inventing reasons 
for the rule that attorney fees could not be recovered as damages. Some of 
these reasons-that the objective value of attorney services is hard to 
determine, and that the extent of a party’s legal expenses reflects his own 
decisions about how to litigate, for which the other party should not be 
 
 42.  Id. at 748. 
 43.  See id. at 739–45 (summarizing a series of nineteenth century cases to reject the purported 
absence of justification). 
 44.  See id. at 745–47 (discussing Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 111–118 (1932)). 
 45.  Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 27 & n.133. Karsten & Batmen’s assertion that I “incorrectly referred 
to” the 1964 and 1967 decisions “as the sources of the public policy rationale for the American Rule” 
overlooks this reference. Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 747. 
 46.  Here are the cases in chronological order, which is also the order in which Karsten and Bateman 
present them: Stewart v. Sowles, 3 La. Ann. 464 (1848); Good v. Mylin, 8 Pa. 51 (1848); Day v. 
Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851); Hicks v. Foster, 13 Barb. 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 1853); St. Peter’s Church 
v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355 (1857); Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146 (1874); Spencer v. Murphy, 41 P. 841 
(Colo. App. 1895). 
 47.  Good, 8 Pa. at 52. 
 48.  Day, 54 U.S. at 372 (1851). 
 49.  Kelly, 21 Minn. at 152.  
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liable–seem equally applicable to the American rule. Indeed, these reasons 
embody the same principles of individualism and freedom of contract that 
underlie the Field Code. Perhaps the vociferous defense of the denial of 
attorney fees as damages can be traced to two other factors. Since damage 
rules were judge-made, some judicial justification for them was required. 
And to allow fees as damages would have benefited prevailing plaintiffs 
but not prevailing defendants-a prospect judges and scholars regarded with 
disapproval.50 
Courts’ willingness to give reasons other than access to justice for 
excluding attorney fees from damages plainly does not equate to asserting 
access to justice as the ground for the American Rule. 
A statement in one of these seven damages cases that might seem to 
support the access to justice policy as a basis for the American Rule does 
not, on examination, do so. In St. Peter’s Church v. Beach,51 the court said 
that: 
honest men are sometimes obliged to resort to courts to get their 
differences settled; and where, though the form of the declaration 
may indicate a legal wrong, there is really no culpability whatever 
imputable to either party, smart money [punitive damages] can not 
be allowed. The parties in these cases should be encouraged to 
appeal to the court on equal terms. The defendant should not be 
punished by being compelled to pay not only his own counsel but 
such as the plaintiff may please to select to advocate his claims 
against the defendant . . . . Besides, a different rule is entirely 
unequal, for the defendant, if he prevails, can never recover any 
more than a statute bill of costs.52 
 This passage is concerned with equality between the parties, which 
would be violated if prevailing plaintiffs could recover their attorney fees as 
part of their damages but prevailing defendants (who do not receive 
damages) could not.53 Its further point is that defending a lawsuit is ordinarily 
not a wrong for which defendants should be punished, not that plaintiffs 
should be encouraged to sue.  
All but one of the remaining six cases, as well as the excerpt from 
legislative history, likewise dealt with rules other than the American Rule. 
In two cases, the court refused to allow plaintiffs to use an indemnity theory 
to recover fees they incurred in previous litigation with a third party.  Both 
 
 50.  Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 23 (footnotes omitted). 
 51.  St. Peter’s Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355 (1857). 
 52.  Id. at 366–67. 
 53.  That rationale reappears in Burruss v. Hines, 94 Va. 413, 420–21 (1897), which Karsten and 
Bateman quote in a footnote. Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 743 n.99.  
2018] THE AMERICAN RULE AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 267 
express fears that fee recovery would encourage excessively vigorous 
litigation.54 One case, and the excerpt from legislative history, criticize 
recovery of exorbitant fees,55 which is not the same as advocating no fee 
recovery as provided by the American Rule, and is not in these instances 
based on any stated concerns about access to court. Two other cases deny 
attorney fee damages to defendants in previous cases who then sued the 
original plaintiffs. In one of these, a suit on an injunction bond, the court 
mentioned the exorbitant fee problem as a reason to refuse recovery.56 In the 
other, a suit for false arrest, the court did rely on the policy of not deterring 
plaintiffs by mulcting them in punitive damages, observing that “[i]t is 
desirable that courts of justice should be open to all men, and that suitors 
should not be deterred from pursuing their rights”57—but this was a 
traditional concern in wrongful litigation suits, whether or not attorney fee 
damages were sought.58 Indeed, in the same year the same court invoked that 
danger to block a suit by a defendant on an injunction bond.59 The American 
Rule was not in question. 
Just one of the thirteen cases described by Karsten and Bateman does 
indeed decide that attorney fees should not be awarded as costs, but it evinces 
no concern for encouraging plaintiffs.60 On the contrary, the court was 
concerned about the burden on defendants: under a fee recovery rule, the 
more doubtful the case, and hence the more the plaintiff’s lawyer could 
 
 54.  See Reggio v. Braggiotti, 61 Mass. 166, 170 (1851) (reasoning that fees “vary so much with the 
character and distinction of the counsel” that it would be “dangerous to permit [a litigant] to impose such 
a charge upon an opponent”); Wynn v. Brooke, 5 Rawle 106, 109 (Pa. 1835) (explaining that recovery 
would allow surety to “indulge an appetite for litigation at the expense of his principal”). Current law is 
more receptive to fee recovery in these situations. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 464–66. 
 55.  See Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137 (1878) (refusing to let plaintiff enforce contractual fee 
recovery clause); Appendix to CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (statement of Sen. Bradbury) 
(1853) (discussing pending fee legislation). 
 56.  Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 231 (1872). Most courts did grant attorney fee damages in this 
situation. 2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 64–69 (1888). 
 57.  Osborn v. Moore, 12 La. Ann. 714, 714 (1857). 
 58.  See, e.g., Adams v. Lisher, 3 Blackf. 241 (Ind. 1833); Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend. 319 
(N.Y.S.Ct. 1839); Spengler v. Davy, 56 Va. 381 (1859); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 180–81, 187–89 (1879).  
 59.  Jamison & McIntosh v. Duncan, 12 La. Ann. 785, 787 (1857). The court explained: 
Parties are too prone to exaggerate their own damages; and there is nothing which more 
frequently requires the careful attention of the courts, than the restraining within reasonable 
bounds the infliction of pecuniary penalties in civil suits . . . . And this attention is the more 
required, when . . . a party is sued for damages for having attempted to pursue what he 
supposed, in good faith, to be his legal rights, according to the forms of law.” 
Id.; see also Grant v. Deuel, 3 Rob. 17, 20 (La. 1842) (“[I]f proof of want of probable cause were not 
required on the part of a plaintiff, every prosecutor would be exposed to an action, in every case of 
acquittal.”). 
 60.  Swartzell v. Rogers, 3 Kan. 380 (1866). 
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charge, the more the defendant would have to pay.61 Fee recovery, the court 
said,  
involves the unreasonable and unjust proposition that the liability of 
the defendants for the counsel fees of the plaintiff shall be larger in 
consequence of the doubtfulness of the plaintiff’s right of recovery, 
or in other words the more doubtful the plaintiff’s right of recovery 
the greater shall be the defendant’s liability to plaintiff’s counsel for 
costs. Such is not the policy of the law . . . .62 
As in many of these cases, the court’s emphasis was on fairness more 
than consequences,63 and certainly not on promoting plaintiffs’ access to 
justice. The court also relied on the “spirit” of the statutes establishing the 
American Rule in actions at law, extending that spirit to the equity 
proceeding before it. Here, as in some other of the thirteen cases,64 the 
American Rule was recognized as a general principle, but that principle 
rested on deference to the legislature rather than any underlying policy.  
In general, the thirteen precedents on which Professors Karsten and 
Bateman rely do not focus on the American Rule, do not rely on a policy of 
opening the courthouse doors to deserving plaintiffs, and indeed express far 
more concern about burdening defendants. Surely, if plaintiffs’ access to 
justice were the point, we would find at least one decision in which the court, 
even though denying a plaintiff recovery of attorney fees, explained that 
equality of denial was really in the best interests of plaintiffs.  
One might ask why, during the same period in which judges mentioned 
access to justice as a reason to legitimate contingent fees, they did not refer 
to that goal while discussing the American Rule. One answer might be that 
the judges exemplified the saying that “if you can think about something 
which is attached to something else without thinking about what it is attached 
to, then you have what is called a legal mind.”65 Another might be that, when 
thinking about the American Rule, judges sought policy in the acts of the 
legislature.66 More basically, judges might have realized that it is far from 
 
 61.  Id. at 383.  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Karsten and Bateman’s reading of this remark as meaning that “courts should not incentivize 
attorneys to take dubious cases” in my opinion adds a new thought to the original. Karsten & Bateman, 
supra note 1, at 743. 
 64.  Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371–72 (1851); Spencer v. Murphy, 41 Pac. 841, 841–42 
(Colo. App. 1895); Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137, 140–41 (1878); Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146, 152–
53 (1874). 
 65.  Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts––The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 
53, 58 (1930) (purporting to quote an unpublished manuscript of Thomas Reed Powell). 
 66.  See case cited supra note 61. 
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obvious when and to what extent the American Rules does promote access 
to the court system. 
Professors Karsten and Bateman have simply not made their case. They 
have shown that nineteenth-century judges thought about the burdens of 
litigation and sometimes sought to reduce or at least equalize them, and that 
they occasionally mentioned access to courts by plaintiffs and defendants 
even when not discussing contingent fees. On my part, I did not mean to 
portray nineteenth-century judicial treatment of all attorney fee issues as 
some kind of policy desert. But when it comes to discussions of the American 
Rule––as opposed to contingent fees, liability for wrongful litigation, and 
other issues––I still fail to find evidence that judges or commentators rooted 
it in public policy, and in particular that they based it on “the need to ensure 
a measure of access for those whose grievances entitled them to a judicial 
hearing without those persons fearing potentially heavy financial 
penalties.”67 Instead, what is striking is that courts that mention access to 
justice in other situations failed to mention it in this one. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that nineteenth-century courts did not describe the 
American Rule as promoting access to justice for those aggrieved, because 
it is far from clear that it actually does so. When early twentieth-century 
commentators began to assess the rule, they disagreed about whether 
compared to the English Rule it encouraged or discouraged litigation, and 
further disagreed about whether encouraging litigation is good or bad.68 As 
explained in the first part of this essay, further study has only emphasized 
the complex impacts of the Rule. So it is not surprising that recent European 
attempts to promote access to court have introduced contingent fees rather 
than the American Rule,69 while in the United States they have supplemented 
contingent fees with hundreds of one-way attorney fee statutes.70 
My own view is that the one clear advantage of the American Rule over 
the English Rule, aside from our being used to it, is that it avoids court 
disputes over attorney fee awards. When it comes to encouraging desirable 
litigation, it is contingent fees (now supplemented by litigation financing), 
 
 67.  Karsten & Bateman, supra note 1, at 748. 
 68.  Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 28 (citing authorities); see also MOORFIELD STOREY, THE REFORM 
OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 35–36 (1912) (“Under existing law it costs little to start a groundless suit . . . . 
[While at the same time] the suitor who seeks only what is justly due him is mulcted severely by the cost 
of recovering what is his own . . . .”). 
 69.  NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE 33–56 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher 
eds., 2010). 
 70.  See sources cited supra note 11. 
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one-way fee shifting statutes, and other institutions that do the heavy work. 
One-way fee statutes offer the further advantage that they can be aimed at 
the sorts of litigation needing encouragement––and after all, litigation cannot 
be regarded as so delightful that it should always and in all circumstances be 
promoted. Whether we have too much litigation of the wrong is debatable,71 
but my own view is that where we most fall short is in the obstacle that heavy 
litigation costs place in the way of smaller claims. That is the problem we 
should address, and the American Rule cannot solve it. 
 
 
 71.  For critiques of the “litigation out of control” theory, see, for example, DAVID M. ENGEL, THE 
MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY: WHY WE DON’T SUE (2016); ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF 
LITIGATION (2017); Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28. 62–89 
(2011) (concluding “the evidence shows “no negative economic effects from more pro-plaintiff tort 
law”); Frank B. Cross, America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189, 190–191 (2003) (defending 
“adversarial legalism” in the United States as generally beneficial); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: 
Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 721–725 (1998) (critiquing 
commonly popular complaints among about the civil justice system); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The 
Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1177, 1177–1182 (2015) 
(assessing trends in the volume of federal civil litigation since 1986 and finding the federal civil caseload 
to be relatively stable). 
